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The Treatment of Mandatory Tax Withholdings in Calculating 
AFDC Benefits: Fairness as a Relevant Inference in 
Ascertaining Congressional Intent 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) is a federal-
state public assistance program originally enacted by Congress as a 
part of the Social Security Act of 1935.1 Participating states2 provide 
assistance to certain needy families,3 and the federal government re-
imburses the state for a certain percentage of the funds thus ex-
pended.4 In order to receive federal reimbursement, the states are 
required to administer their programs pursuant to a state plan in 
accordance with federal statutory provisions and U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations governing AFDC. 5 
The AFDC program is intended to provide assistance only to 
families that are "needy" and only in the amount that is needed. 6 
The amount of an AFDC family's monthly grant is determined by 
comparing the "income"7 of the AFDC family, less certain deduc-
tions referred to as "disregards,"8 with the particular state's "stan-
dard of need" for a hypothetical family of that size.9 
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), 10 
l. The AFDC program was authorized in Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. 
L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-676 (1982)). 
2. States may choose not to participate in the AFDC program. Once a state elects to par-
ticipate, however, it must adhere to the relevant federal statutes and regulations. McCoog v. 
Hegstrom, 528 F. Supp. 575, 578 (D. Or. 1981), a.ffd, 690 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1982). 
3. To be eligible for assistance, needy families must include a dependent child, as defined 
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 606(a), 607(a) (1982), and establish need by meeting certain income tests, the 
guidelines for which are stated in 42 U.S.C. § 602. Approximately 1 I.I million individuals 
received AFDC assistance during 1981. Duvall, Goudreau & Marsh, Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children: Characteristics of Recipients in 1979, Soc. SECURITY BULL., Apr. 1982, at 3. 
4. 42 u.s.c. § 603 (1982). 
5. 42 u.s.c. § 602 (1982). 
6. See notes 126-28 iefra and accompanying text. This objective has found expression 
more generally in the Reagan administration's policy that social welfare programs should con-
stitute a "social safety net" for the "truly needy." See, e.g., Pear, Sh!ft for Social Welfare: 
Reagan Seeking to Uproot Old Philosophy By Providing Aid Only for Truly Destitute, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 28, 1981, at A22, col. l. 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1982). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A) (1982). 
9. Each state has discretion to set its own "standard of need" for AFDC. The "standard of 
need" is the state's view of the amount of money needed to provide for the essential needs of a 
hypothetical family. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(l7) (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2) (1983). 
There is a gross disparity in the benefit levels set by the states. For a family of three with 
no other income, maximum monthly benefits range from $96 in Mississippi to $571 in Alaska. 
Moreover, since 1969, the value of benefits, adjusted for inflation, has declined an average of 
24%. Comment, The 1981 AFDC Amendments: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 81, 
84 n.20 (1982). 
10. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981). 
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Congress altered the formula for calculating AFDC benefits 11 by 
changing the so-called "disregards."12 Prior to OBRA, states were 
required to disregard all work-related expenses before determining 
an applicant's need. 13 OBRA replaced this open-ended, individually 
calculated disregard with a flat $75 figure for work expenses. 14 In 
implementing this change, HHS issued instructions to the states that 
the standard $75 disregard is to be deducted from "gross income," 
calculated to include taxes withheld from a recipient's earnings, and 
that such withholdings are to be regarded as work expenses covered 
by the standard disregard. 15 Recipients have challenged this inter-
pretation, claiming that mandatory payroll deductions for taxes have 
never been considered either "income" or "work expenses" and that 
Congress did not intend to change this long-standing policy when it 
passed OBRA.16 The courts are divided regarding which interpreta-
tion is in accord with Congressional intent.17 
11. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2301, 95 Stat. 357, 
843-44 (1981) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1982)) (hereinafter referred to as OBRA], 
12. OBRA made changes in disregards for work expenses, the cost of care for a child or 
incapacitated adult, and work incentives. This Note is directly concerned with the change in-
volving work expense disregards. 
13. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 172, 188 
(amended 1981). Prior to OBRA, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) provided "that the state agency shall, 
in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources . • • as well as 
any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income." 
14. See Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2301, 95 Stat. 357, 843-44 (1981) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (1982)). 
15. See Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1982), affd. sub nom. Turner v. 
Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 
(1984). 
16. See cases cited at note 17 i,ifra. The exclusion of mandatory tax withholdings from 
"income" can make a significant difference in the amount of a working recipient's grant. See 
notes 141-43 i,ifra and accompanying text. 
17. For reported decisions upholding the position of HHS, see James v. O'Bannon, 715 
F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1983); Dickenson v. Petit, 569 F. Supp. 636 (D. Me. 1983) (summary judg-
ment granted), affd., 728 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1984); Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. 386 (D. Md.), 
affd. sub nom. Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983); Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. 
llOO (D. Me.), affd. on other grounds, 692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1982) (preliminary injunction 
denied). For reported opinions ruling in favor of recipients (that mandatory tax withholdings 
are not "income"), see Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub. nom. 
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(permanent injunction granted); Williamson v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687 (W.D. Wash. 1983), 
appeal docketed, No. 83-3725 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1983); Nishimoto v. Sunn, 561 F. Supp. 692 (D. 
Hawaii 1983), revd. and remanded mem., 734 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1984); RAM v. Blum, 533 F. 
Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (preliminary injunction granted). 
As this Note was going to press, Congress passed legislation amending 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) 
(8) with the intention of clarifying the status of mandatory tax withholdings. See Deficit Re-
duction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 1135 (1984); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 98-
861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1394-95 (1984). The amendment to§ 602(a)(8) provides that in im-
plementing§ 602(a)(8) "the term 'earned income' shall mean gross earned income, prior to any 
deductions for taxes or for any other purposes." 98 Stat. 494, 1135 (1984). This added lan-
guage does not clearly resolve the issue framed by the courts in Turner and Ram and discussed 
in this Note, ie. whether mandatory withholding taxes are considered "work expenses" under 
§ 602(a)(8) or whether they are considered nonincome under 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7). The 
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This Note contends that the more appropriate construction of the 
statute is to view mandatory tax withholdings as nonincome and 
nonwork expense items. Part I traces the pre-OBRA legislative and 
administrative history and examines the judicial interpretations of 42 
U.S.C. section 602(a)(7) "income" and section 602(a)(8) "earned in-
come." It concludes that under the "availability" principle, tax with-
holdings have always been regarded as nonincome items distinct 
from work expenses. It contends that, notwithstanding contradictory 
language in the regulations implementing section 602(a)(8), the sta-
tus of tax withholdings as nonincome items under section 602(a)(7) is 
controlling. Part II considers the legislative history and purposes of 
OBRA. It argues that the legislative intent is consistent with the ex-
clusion of mandatory withholding taxes from the income considered 
in determining need. Finally, Part III demonstrates that inclusion of 
mandatory withholdings in the flat work expense disregard would 
result in unfair and unequal treatment of working recipients relative 
to nonworking recipients. It asserts that, absent a clear indication to 
the contrary, courts should presume that legislatures intend to treat 
similarly situated individuals equally in passing legislation. 
I. PRE-OBRA TREATMENT OF MANDATORY TAX WITHHOLDINGS 
The pertinent language in section 602(a)(7) regarding the consid-
eration of a recipient's "income" in determining need has remained 
relatively unchanged since it was enacted in 1939.18 By leaving the 
language unchanged, the OBRA Congress must be presumed to have 
adopted the interpretation given that language by previous Con-
gresses, courts, and administrative agencies. 19 Thus, in order to de-
termine the intended meaning of "income" in section 602(a)(7), it is 
necessary to trace the legislative, judicial, and administrative history 
of the language from its inception in 1939 to the passage of OBRA in 
1981.2° 
House Conference Report, however, does indicate that Congress intended to clarify the issue 
that had been troubling the courts. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-861, supra. Therefore, while 
the amending language itself does not clearly resolve the ambiguity, the intent of the 98th 
Congress is fairly clear, arguably resolving the question of how to treat tax withholdings pro-
spectively from the enactment of the amendment in July 1984. See Heckler v. Turner, 53 
U.S.L.W. 3114, 3115 (Rhenquist, J., Circuit Justice, Aug. 10, 1984) (in-chambers opinion 
granting stay of injunction pending review by the Coun). For the purpose of determining 
benefits prior to this July 1984 amendment, the question remains as to what the 97th Congress 
intended when it passed OBRA in 1981. 
18. See notes 23-25 infra and accompanying text. 
19. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 382 n.66 
(1982) ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an ... interpretation of a statute and to adopt 
that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change." (citations omitted)), quoted in 
James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 804-05 (3d Cir. 1983); IA SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION§ 22.33 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1972) (quoted in pan at note 75 infra) [hereinafter cited 
as SUTHERLAND]. 
20. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Evidence of congressional 
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When Congress initially enacted the AFDC program in 1935, it 
neglected to provide that income already available to the household 
should be taken into consideration in determining need for grants.21 
In 1939, Congress solved this problem by adding 42 U.S.C. section 
602(a)(7),22 which required that states consider "any other income 
and resources" of a claimant in determining need.23 In 1962, section 
602(a)(7) was amended to create a work expense allowance by add-
ing the requirement that "expenses reasonably attributable to the 
earning of any such income" also be considered in determining 
need.24 In 1968, Congress revised 42 U.S.C. section 602(a)(8), creat-
ing the so-called "work incentive disregard."25 This disregard con-
sisted of the first $30 plus one-third of a recipient's monthly "earned 
income."26 It was instituted to encourage work by allowing recipi-
intent in enacting legislation is often found in legislative history . . . and understanding legis-
lative history is often aided by the history of administrative interpretations of a statute ••• ," 
(citations omitted)), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). 
21. Social Security Act of 1935, tit. IV§ 402, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat, 620,627 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-676 (1982)). 
22. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d I 109, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted stJb nom. Heckler V, 
Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). 
23. As originally passed in 1939, § 602(a)(7) read as follows: "A state plan for aid and 
services to needy families must . . . (7) provide that the State agency shall, in determining 
need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child claiming aid to 
dependent children .... " Social Security Amendments Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, 
§ 40I(b), 53 Stat. 1360, 1379 (1939). 
24. The 1962 version of§ 602(a)(7) read as follows: "[T]he State agency shall, in determin-
ing need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative 
claiming aid to families with dependent children, as well as any expenses reasonably attributa-
ble to the earning of any such income . ... " Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 
87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 172, 188 (1962) (emphasis added). The purpose of this amendment 
was to neutralize employment disincentives by requiring states to consider work expenses in 
determining need. See notes 42-46 iefra and accompanying text. The work expense allowance 
was implemented by 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(iv) (1970), which provided that "in determining 
the availability of income and resources, the following will not be included as income: (a) 
Income equal to expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of income." This provision 
no longer applies to AFDC after OBRA. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(iv)(A) (1983). 
25. Section 602(a)(7) was also amended to link to § 602(a)(8). The relevant portions of 
§ 602(a), as amended in 1968, read: 
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must . . . 
(7) except as may be otherwise provided in clause (8), provide that the State agency shall, 
in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child 
or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children, . . . as well as any expenses 
reasonably attributable to the earning of any such income; 
(8) provide that, in making the determination under clause (7), the State agency-
(A) shall with respect to any month disregard -
(ii) ... (for] a relative receiving such aid ... the first $30 of the total of such earned 
income for such month plus one-third of the remainder of such income for such month 
Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 202(b), 81 Stat. 881-82 (amended 
1981). Unlike the work expense disregard, which served to equalize the incomes of working 
and nonworking recipients, this provision acted as an employment incentive by allowing work-
ing recipients to retain a portion of their earnings above the minimum standard of need. See 
notes 144-47 iefra and accompanying text. 
26. See note 25 supra. 
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ents to retain some of their earnings without a reduction in bene-
fits. 27 In 1981, OBRA amended both sections by removing the 
provision for consideration of work expenses from section 602(a)(7) 
and adding the flat $75 work expense disregard (and other provi-
sions) to section 602(a)(8).28 The courts that have ruled for HHS 
have held that Congress intended section 602(a)(8) to control the 
need calculation and that tax withholdings are included in both "in-
come" and "earned income" and are covered by the flat $75 work 
expense disregard.29 Courts ruling for the recipients have held that 
section 602(a)(7) controls the need calculation, that mandatory tax 
withholdings have never been considered either part of "income" or 
a "work expense," and that the OBRA Congress did not intend to 
change this long-standing treatment of mandatory tax withholdings 
as nonincome items. 30 
A. THE AVAILABILITY PRINCIPLE 
Mandatory payroll deductions for federal and state income taxes 
did not exist in 1939, so there is nothing in the legislative history of 
the 1939 amendments addressing the question of whether such with-
holdings should be treated as "income."31 In the hearings and floor 
debate that accompanied the addition of section 602(a)(7), however, 
concern was expressed that the needy not be penalized through the 
inclusion in their income of sums not actually available to them.32 
27. Sees. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, 146, 157-59 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2834, 2837, 2982, 2994-96 [hereinafter cited as s. REP. No. 744, 
reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS]. 
28. The statute as amended currently reads in pertinent part as follows: 
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must . . . 
(7) except as may be otherwise provided in paragraph (8) ... provide that the state 
agency-
(A) shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of 
any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children . . . . 
(8)(A) provide that, with respect to any month, in making the determination under 
paragraph (7), the State agency - . 
(ii) shall disregard from the earned income of any child or relative applying for or 
receiving aid to families with dependent children ... the first $75 of the total of such 
earned income for such month (or such lesser amount as the Secretary may prescribe in 
the case of an individual not engaged in full-time employment or not employed through-
out the month) . . . . 
Pub. L. No. 97-35, §§ 2301-2302, 95 Stat. 357, 843-45 (1981) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) 
(1982)). 
29. See cases ruling for HHS cited at note 17 supra. 
30. See cases ruling for recipients cited at note 17 supra. 
31. See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 639 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
32. See Social Security, 1939: Hearings Relative to the Social Security Act Amendments of 
1939 Before the House Comm on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2254 (1939) (testi-
mony of Arthur Altmeyer, chairman of the Social Security Board), and 84 CONG. REC. 6851 
(1939) (remarks of Rep. Poage), cited in Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983), 
cert. granted sub nom Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). 
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The Social Security Board33 reported and elaborated on the "availa-
bility" principle in a policy statement issued soon after the enact-
ment of the 1939 amendments.34 The income should "actually exist'' 
and "be available to the applicant. To be regarded as available, an 
income or resource must be actually on hand or ready for use when 
it is needed."35 This policy was subsequently incorporated in the 
Board's Guide to Public Assistance Administration,36 and has contin-
ued to exist in some form in administrative regulations for the 
AFDC program ever since.37 
Tax withholdings have never been considered available income 
under section 602(a)(7) in evaluating need. In 1961, an HEW report 
stated: "[T]he term 'gross income,' as used by States . . . refers to 
33. See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 639 n.l I (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (''The Social Security 
Board was the federal agency charged with administering the AFDC program until 1946. At 
that time the task was taken over by the Federal Security Agency, which administered the 
program from 1946 until 1953 .... The newly created Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare became the administering agency in 1953 .... (I]n 1979, [HEW] was redesignated 
the Department of Health and Human Services.") . 
34. See SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, POLICY STATEMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD 
at 2 (Dec. 20, 1940), quoted in Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1115 n.8 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. 
granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984), and RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 
634,639 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The policy statement also noted that "(t]he income or resource 
shall have some appreciable significance in meeting the requirements of the applicant." POL· 
ICY STATEMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, supra, at 2, quoted in Turner, 707 F.2d at 
lll5 n.8. 
35. POLICY STATEMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, supra note 34, quoted in RAM 
v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 639 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
36. The GUIDE TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION was the source of federal admin-
istrative regulations and instructions to the states for the period 1935-I 946. It was succeeded 
by the HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, which continued in use through 
1967. The language of the Social Security Board policy statement, notes 34 & 35 supra and 
accompanying text, was repeated almost verbatim in the 1942 edition of the GUIDE. See RAM 
v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 640 & n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, 
GUIDE TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AoMINISTRATJON § 202 at 2 (May 22, 1942)). 
37. See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634,640 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The 1967 version of the 
availability regulation was quoted by one court as follows: "[O]nly income and resources that 
are, in fact, available to an applicant or recipient for current use on a regular basis will be 
taken into consideration in determining need and the amount of payment." Lewis v. Martin, 
397 U.S. 552, 555 (1970) (citing HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, 
§ 3131.7). The 1969 version read: "[O]nly such net income as is actually available for current 
use on a regular basis will be considered, and only currently available resources will be consid-
ered." 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1969). The Supreme Court has noted that the availabil-
ity principle as embodied in these regulations clearly comports with § 602(a)(7) of the statute. 
Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 553 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 319 n.16 (1968). 
The post-OBRA version of this regulation reads: "Net income ... and resources are con-
sidered available ... when actually available ... for support and maintenance." 45 C.F.R. 
§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1983). In its response to comments regarding the OBRA interim regula-
tions, HHS indicated that they did not alter the "currently available" standard: 
Comment. One of the comments asked for a definition of "currently available" when 
applied to evaluating resources. 
Response; The existing regulation at § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) gives a clear statement of what 
"currently available" means, and is unchanged by [OBRAJ. 
47 Fed. Reg. 5648, 5657 (1982) ("Discussion of Major Provisions and Response to 
Comments."). 
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'take-home pay' after payroll deductions ... have been made. 'Net 
income' refers to amounts available after other employment costs 
have been recognized." 38 No federal court has applied the availabil-
ity principle specifically to tax withholdings.39 However, this simply 
may have been unnecessary because states were uniformly excluding 
such withholdings from income.40 Moreover, there is an element of 
conceptual incongruity in the notion of mandatory withholdings be-
38. G. WHITE, STATE METHODS FOR DETERMINING NEED IN THE AID TO DEPENDENT 
CHILDREN PROGRAM 25 (Public Assistance Report No. 43, 1961). The court in granting de-
fendant's motion for su=ary judgment in Dickenson v. Petit, 569 F. Supp. 636, 643 (D. Me. 
1983), ajfd., 728 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1984), responded to this report by reasoning that it "does not 
support plaintiffs' argument that the prevailing state practice was requiredby federal law," 569 
F. Supp. at 643 (emphasis in original), and concluded that after the introduction of the work 
expense disregard in 1962, "there was no longer a need for the states artificially to categorize 
withholdings and other expenses as unavailable income." 569 F. Supp. at 644. The court then 
offers no explanation, however, for why mandatory withholdings, a major item, were men-
tioned neither by speakers urging the passage of the work expense disregard in 1962, see notes 
43-44 infra and accompanying text, nor in the section of DEPARTMENT OF HEW, HANDBOOK 
OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION (1962 ed.) that defines work expenses under this 
disregard. See 569 F. Supp. at 644 & n.6; note 45 infra and accompanying text. 
A similar argument in Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. 386, 391-92 (D. Md.), ajfd. sub nom. 
Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983), was based on Justice Powell's language in Shea 
v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 254-55 (1974) (describing Colorado's characterization of 
mandatory payroll deductions as employment related expenses). The Ile/I court concluded 
that "the states were lumping together mandatorily withheld taxes with other work expenses 
and thus including such taxes as expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of income." 
558 F. Supp. at 392. But see notes 51-57 infra and accompanying text. 
The Dickenson court, in denying a preliminary injunction to the plaintiff, contended that 
the "availability principle" is literally inapplicable to tax withholdings, interpreting it not as 
limiting the definition of "income," but rather as "circumscrib[ing] the income sources to be 
considered." Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. 1100, 1116 n.13 (D. Me.), ajfd on other grounds, 
692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1982). However, this argument is not supported by the cases cited in 
Dickenson, which were concerned not only with sources, but also with amounts of income. C.f. 
RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 641 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Shea v. Vialpando does not mean 
that withheld taxes cannot be considered "unavailable."). The cases at issue or dealing with 
the same concerns are Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338, 346 (1975) (amount of contribution 
by lodger rather than existence of lodger is only justification for reducing AFDC grant); Na-
tional Welfare Rights Org. v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637,647 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (failure to consider 
encumbrances on property in determining its value to applicant was inconsistent with the 
availability requirement); Barron v. Bellairs, 496 F.2d 1187, 1188 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) 
(may not compute grants based on average monthly income of child support where family 
received support only sporadically); Jamroz v. Blum, 509 F. Supp. 953, 960-61 (N.D.N.Y. 
1981) (financial aid for school, when given under conditions that preclude its use for current 
living conditions, cannot be considered available to meet current need); Brown v. Bates, 363 F. 
Supp. 897, 901 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (money given for educational purposes under Work Study 
Program cannot be considered "actually available for current use"); Garcia v. Swoap, 63 Cal. 
App. 3d 903, 911-13, 134 Cal. Rptr. 137, 142-44 (1976) (may not base AFDC grants on income 
received in a previous month), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978). Nor is the Dickenson argu-
ment consistent with the thrust of the original regulations setting forth the availability princi-
ple. The Social Security Board's GUIDE TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION in 1942 
stated: "(l]ncome should not be attributed to sources and kinds of property that produce no 
income or that are not meeting a requirement of the applicant. Neither should income be attrib-
uted in excess of the income actually produced or in excess of the benefit derived" RAM v. 
Blum, 564 F. Supp. at 640 n.15 (emphasis added) (quoting SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, GUIDE 
TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION § 202 at 2 (May 22, 1942)). 
39. SeeJames v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 805 (3d Cir. 1983). 
40. This is implied by G. WHITE, supra note 38, at 25. 
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ing immediately available. There are a number of state cases hold-
ing that such amounts are neither "actually" nor "currently" 
available to a household to meet its needs and are therefore not 
"income. "41 
B. WORK EXPENSES 
In amending section 602(a)(7) to provide that states consider not 
only the income and resources of recipients in determining need but 
also "any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of any 
such income,"42 neither Congress nor HEW regarded mandatory tax 
withholdings as a work expense. Before these amendments, federal 
agencies encouraged but did not require states to allow credit for 
work-related expenses so as not to discourage recipients from work-
ing. The agency focus, however, was on out-of-pocket employment-
related expenses; mandatory tax withholdings were not mentioned.43 
Nor were they mentioned in either the legislative history of the 1962 
amendments44 or the definitions of work expenses articulated by 
41. See County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 749, 488 P.2d 953, 966, 97 Cal. 
Rptr. 385, 398 (1971) (AFDC program); Harbolic v. Berger, 43 N.Y.2d 102, 371 N.E.2d 499, 
400 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1977) (state home-relief program); Dumbleton v. Reed, 40 N.Y.2d 586,357 
N.E.2d 363, 388 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1976) {Medicaid program); Watson v. Department of Pub. 
Welfare, 42 Pa. Co=w. 181,400 A.2d 669 (1979) (state general assistance program). Bui see 
JJickenson, 536 F. Supp. at 1116 n.13 (distinguishing Harbolic, JJumblelon and Watson on the 
ground that they dealt with statutes other than AFDC, and Harbolic and Watson also because 
of different legislative histories). 
42. Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 106(b), 76 Stat. 172, 188 
(1962); see note 24 supra. 
43, See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634,643 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting from DEPARTMENT 
OF HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION§ 3140 (1962 ed.): 
A State public assistance agency may establish a reasonable minimum money amount to 
represent the combined additional cost of three items - food, clothing, and personal inci-
dentals - for all employed persons. The State plan may provide that other items of work 
expense will be allowed when there is a determination that such expenses do, in fact, exist 
in the individual case. 
44. In the hearings and floor debate prior to passage of the 1962 work expense disregard, 
many examples of work expenses were given, but mandatory tax withholdings were never 
mentioned. See, e.g., Public Assistance Act of 1962: Hearings on R.R. 10606 Before the Senate 
Comm. on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1962) (colloquy between HEW Secretary Ribicoff 
and Senator Curtis): 
Senator CURTIS ..•. 
Now, on page 14 the bill before us requires that a State agency in determining need 
must take into account any expenses that may be reasonably attributable to the earning of 
income. 
The requirement is new; it is not? (sic] 
Secretary RIBICOFF. That is correct. 
Senator CURTIS. Explain how that would work? 
Secretary RIBICOFF. Well, basically, let us say that for a woman or a man to get a 
job he would have to take a train or a bus, and the transportation expenses might be $1 a 
day. 
He would have to be given a credit for $1 a day or, let us say, he had a job where he 
had to get special goggles or special safety shoes, items of clothing or let's say he had a job 
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HEW in implementing the 1962 amendments.45 The logical infer-
ence to be drawn is that tax withholdings were not mentioned be-
cause states were already required to disregard them as nonincome 
items under the availability principle.46 
From 1962 to 1974, many states included mandatory tax with-
holdings in their lists of work expenses,47 but this inclusion may be 
viewed as a matter of administrative convenience rather than sub-
stantive significance. Because both mandatory tax withholdings and 
work expenses generally were being disregarded in full, there was no 
reason to distinguish between them.48 However, most states that had 
where he was required to buy uniforms. He might have a job in a gas station or a hotel, 
where the uniforms had to be bought. 
Senator CURTIS. A State can take those things into account now? 
Secretary RIBICOFF. They can. But not all of them do. What we are trying to do, 
Senator Curtis, is do everything we can to encourage people to get a job and work and we 
feel it is important to encourage the States. By having this provision, the State will take 
into account these expenses so people will get jobs. I believe that the State should give 
them an allowance for those items that are necessary for them to get the job. 
Senator Kern, a leading proponent of the bill in floor debate, described the amendment as 
requiring states to take into account expenses incurred by AFDC recipients in the earning of 
income and gave as examples "bus fare, ... clothing, and similar items." 108 Cong. Rec. 
12,663 (1962). 
45. In 1963 and 1964, after enactment of the work expense disregard, HEW explained the 
deduction of work expenses in§ 3140 of the HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRA-
TION in much the same way as it had prior to the 1962 amendments. The agency also provided 
an extensive list of items that states might consider as employment expenses, including 
uniforms, transportation, employee benefits, tools, licenses, union or other dues, education, 
publications, child care and protective clothing. No mention was made of mandatory tax with-
holdings. See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). In light of the fact that 
such withholdings probably entail more money than any item on the list and may even ap-
proach their combined total, the omission is a "glaring" one. "It is unimaginable that so sig-
nificant an item would have been left out of section 3140 if, as defendants contend, mandatory 
payroll deductions were being treated as 'employment expenses.'" RAM v. Blum, 564 F. 
Supp. 634, 643 & nn.23-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Dickenson v. Petit, 569 F. Supp. 636, 645 
(D. Me. 1983) ("Nor do [plaintiffs] suggest how regulations as detailed as those dealing with 
AFDC need calculations could reasonably be thought to have overlooked any mention of 
payroll withholdings."), qjfd, 728 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1984). 
46. See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text. 
The district court in James v. O'Bannon thought work expenses, particularly payroll de-
ductions for items like union dues, indistinguishable from tax withholdings, calling such a 
distinction one "whose economic real world significance is very hard to appreciate.'' 557 F. 
Supp. 631, 641 (E.D. Pa. 1982), qjfd, 715 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Dickenson v. Petit, 
569 F. Supp. 636, 645 (D. Me. 1983), qjfd, 728 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1984). The arguments in note 
45 supra contain two refutations to this reasoning. First, the "economic significance" of the 
distinction is all too real to recipients when the amounts are compared. See also note 142 infra. 
Second, the DEPARTMENT OF HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC AsSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION 
(1962 ed.) list specifically included union dues, yet omitted taxes. 
47. SeeJames v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 804 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEW, SUMMARY OF STATE AGENCY POLICY ON EXPENSES 
REASONABLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE EARNING OF INCOME 122a-35a app. (1972) (42 states 
recognized one or more mandatory tax withholdings as expenses reasonably attributable to the 
earning of income). But see note 60 infra and accompanying text. 
48. See, e.g., Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 612-13 (N.D. Cal. 1982), qjfd sub nom. 
Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1120 {9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 
104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); note 61 infra and 
accompanying text. 
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the standard deductions for work expenses in 1972 required that 
mandatory tax withholdings be itemized and disregarded sepa-
rately.49 Since these were the only states that had any reason to dif-
ferentiate between mandatory tax withholdings and work expenses, 
the fact that most of them did so distinguish supports the view that 
the two items were regarded as being conceptually different.50 
In Shea v. Vialpando,51 the Supreme Court faced the question of 
whether a state could limit all disregarded employment expenses, ex-
cluding child care, to a flat amount per month.52 The Court held 
that under pre-OBRA section 602(a)(7) employment expenses had to 
be deducted in full.53 States could still use a standard disregard for 
such expenses, but only if provision was made to accommodate those 
whose expenses exceeded the flat amount.54 
Some courts have cited language in Shea to support the proposi-
tion that prior to OBRA mandatory tax withholdings were consid-
ered ''work expenses" to be deducted from "gross" income.55 While 
some of the Shea language may be so interpreted, contrary interpre-
tations favoring a view of mandatory tax withholdings as separate 
from work expenses are equally plausible.56 More importantly, the 
49. According to RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634,644 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing HEW Inter-
nal Memorandum (Feb. I, 1972)), in 1972 fifteen states used a flat deduction for work expenses 
other than child care and twelve of these required that mandatory tax withholdings be item-
ized separately and in addition to the set amount. See also Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 
612 (N.D. Cal. 1982), ajfd. sub nom. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d I 109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted 
sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984) (also citing HEW Internal Memorandum 
(Feb. I, 1972)). 
50. See note 49 supra and accompanying text. Bui see James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 
806-07 (3d Cir. 1983). The James court rejected this argument on the basis that "in January of 
1972 at least.five states ... did not regard themselves as bound to disregard all mandatory tax 
withholdings under the 'availability principle.'" The court is wrong regarding at least one of 
the states it cites: Colorado. See Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251,255 & n.3 (1974) (discussing 
Colorado's standard work-expense allowance); note 52 i,!fra,- see also note 60 i,!fra and accom-
panying text. 
51. 416 U.S. 251 (1974). 
52. 416 U.S. at 252-53. At issue was the Colorado state plan, which limited work expenses 
to a flat $30 per month disregard but allowed for individualized treatment of mandatory pay-
roll deductions and child care expenses. 416 U.S. at 255 (discussing 4 COLORADO DIVISION OF 
PUBLIC WELFARE STAFF MANUAL§ 4313.13 (effective March 1970)). 
53. 416 U.S. at 258, 262, 265. 
54. 416 U.S. at 265 (citations omitted). 
55. See Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. 386, 392-94 (D. Md.), ajfd. sub nom. Bell v. Mas-
singa, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983); James v. O'Bannon, 557 F. Supp. 631, 639, 641 (E.D. Pa. 
1982); ajfd., 715 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1983); Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. llOO, ll 10-13 (D. 
Me.), ajfd. on other grounds, 692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1982); Dickenson v. Petit, 569 F. Supp, 636 
(D. Me. 1983), ajfd., 728 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1984). 
56. The court in Bell v. Hellleman relied on the Shea Court's implicit approval of HEW 
regulation 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6) (1983) (see note 64 i,!fra), in which "earned income" was 
defined as total income tax deductions. 558 F. Supp. 386, 392 (D. Md.), ajfd. sub nom. Bell v. 
Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983). This reasoning is dubious. First, neither the regulation 
cited nor§ 602(a)(8) of the statute that it implemented was at issue in Shea. The case involved 
the interpretation of the work expense allowance in § 602(a)(7), not the work incentive disre-
gard to which§ 602(a)(8) was relevant. See notes 85-99 i,!fra and accompanying text. Second, 
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value of Shea as authority in this instance is questionable. The ques-
tion of whether mandatory tax withholdings were "income" to be 
disregarded or simply not "income" at all was not before the Court 
nor was it germane to the analysis of the case.57 
Following Shea, most states included mandatory tax withhold-
ings on the list of work expenses used to compute expenses, 58 but 
some continued to itemize them separately.59 Even though the for-
in the quoted passages the Shea Court views this regulation as indicative of Congress' aware-
ness of the availability principle. The Shea court did not suggest that the regulation in any 
way altered the treatment of tax withholdings as nonincome. 
The court in Dickenson v. Pe/ii cites from Shea, 416 U.S. at 254, in support of the proposi-
tion that "§ 602(a)(7) income" means ''gross income" including mandatory tax withholdings: 
"In determining nel income [as in 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1983), see note 37 supra], 
any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of income are deducted from gross in-
come." 536 F. Supp. HOO, lll0 (D. Me.) (emphasis added) (citation omitted), affd. on other 
grounds, 692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1982). Justice Powell, however, may be viewed as addressing 
the importance of the availability principle in this and other passages, using the phrases "gross 
or total income" as opposed to "net income" as a means of distinguishing income before and 
after work expenses have been disregarded. See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 641 n.17 
(1983). For example, Powell also observes that "expenses attributable to the earning of income 
. . . reduce the level of acrually available income, and if not deducted from gross income will 
not produce a corresponding increase in AFDC assistance." 416 U.S. at 264 (emphasis added). 
This language suggests that Justice Powell equated "gross income" for the purposes of 
602(a)(7) with "available income." See also note 84 infra and accompanying text (arguing for 
a broad reading of income as used in § 602(a)(8)). 
In arguing that "the Supreme Court ... implicitly recognized mandatory payroll deduc-
tions ... as work-related expenses under pre-OBRA law," 536 F. Supp. at 1114, the Dicken-
son court relied heavily on Powell's statements that "while Colorado continued to allow 
individualized treatment of mandatory payroll deductions and child care costs, all other work-
related expenses were subjected to a uniform allowance of$30 .... " and that "(a]ccording to 
HEW, 20 states, including Colorado, presently employ a standard work-expense allowance in 
combination with actual child care expenses, and in some cases mandatory payroll deductions 
.... " 536 F. Supp. at ll 12 & n.9 (quoting Shea, 416 U.S. at 255 & n.3). However, this 
reliance is incorrect. First, the footnote quoted from Shea, 416 U.S. at 255 n.3, and related 
statements are merely descriptive of state plans; they are in no sense a prescriptive statement of 
the Court concerning the treatment of mandatory tax withholdings. Moreover, of these states 
the overwhelming majority treated mandatory tax withholdings as separate from work ex-
penses. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text. Second, Justice Powell's description of 
the Colorado plan in which the phrase "all other work-related expenses" follows the reference 
to mandatory payroll deductions and child-care costs, is gra=atically ambiguous since the 
word "other" may be read to refer solely to child-care costs. See Turner v. Woods, 559 F. 
Supp. 603, 612 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1982), affd. sub nom. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1118 n.10 
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). 
57. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, lll8 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. 
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634,641 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983); note 56 supra. 
58. See Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. 386, 392 n.8 (D. Md.), affd. sub nom. Bell v. Mas-
singa, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting Social Security Staff Analysis prepared by the 
Senate Finance Committee (Mar. 22, 1978)) ("All states consider State, Federal and Social 
Security taxes as expenses of employment."). 
59. The Court in RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 644 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), looked 
closely at the HEW Internal Memorandum (Mar. 22, 1978). See note 58 supra. The memoran-
dum noted that "[i]n 1978, thirty-four states ... apparently used standard deductions for 
work expenses. . . . Half of those states required separate itemization of mandatory payroll 
deductions." 564 F. Supp. at 644 n.26. The other half permitted itemizing of all actual ex-
penses and deductions in lieu of the standard disregard. 564 F. Supp. at 644 n.26. 
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mer practice was prevalent, a change in the way a federal statute is 
administered on the state level can hardly be said to change the in-
tent with which it was enacted.60 More importantly, since every state 
now was required to disregard both work expenses and tax withhold-
ings in full, there was no need to distinguish between the two.61 Fi-
nally, it is not clear that Congress was cognizant of any change in 
practice inconsistent with the long standing interpretation of section 
602(a)(7) "income" when it enacted OBRA.62 
C. RELATIONSHIP OF SECTION 602(A)(7) AND 602(A)(8) 
When Congress created the "work incentive disregard" by revis-
60. See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Even if some number of 
administering state agencies had misconstrued the terms of the statute, in a manner which had 
no effect on the amount of benefits paid, their erroneous practice would be scant basis for 
concluding that the meaning of statutory terms should be read in a new light."). Moreover, the 
RAM court suggests that various HEW memoranda issued during the 1970's attest to the fact 
that the agency's own construction of the terms "income" and "work expenses" remained rela-
tively unchanged through 1981. 564 F. Supp. at 643 n.25. 
61. See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Turner v. Woods, 559 F. 
Supp. 603, 612-13 (N.D. Cal. 1982), ajfd. sub nom. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1120 (9th 
Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); notes 48, 57-60 
supra and accompanying text. 
In James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 805-06 (3d Cir. 1983), the court rejects this argument. 
First, it contends that tax withholdings prior to OBRA were only deducted from gross earnings 
after 1969 because they were deemed to be work expenses under 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) 
(1969), implementing regulation to§ 602(a)(8). See note 64 infra. Without finally deciding the 
question of whether prior to 1969 the availability principle applied to tax withholdings, see115 
F.2d at 803, 807, the court then suggests that beginning in 1969 they were so deducted because 
under 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) all disregards were controlled by § 602(a)(8) of the stat-
ute. However, the language quoted by the court for the 1969 regulation and the reference to 
Dickenson, 536 F. Supp. at 1111 n.8, cited at715 F.2d at 806, are from the 1981 OBRA amend-
ments, see note 37 supra, not the 1969 regulation, which reads: "All income and resources, 
after policies governing the allowable reserve, disregard or setting aside of income and re-
sources have been applied, will be considered in relation to the State's standard of assist-
ance .... " 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(a) (1969). Thus, the regulation in 1969 refers not to 
all disregards, as implied by the James court, but only "disregard[s] .•. of income," that is, 
the work incentive disregard. See generally notes 85-98 infra and accompanying text. Finally, 
the court concludes with the argument that if tax withholdings were not work expenses they 
should not be disregarded at all (although conceptually nonincome would not have to be disre-
garded) because under the availability principle their loss would be more than offset by the 
gain represented by the work incentive disregard. The court understandably makes no effort 
to justify its odd perception of this disregard. 
62. As the Ninth Circuit in Turner noted: 
The defendants appear to argue here that the agency practice became so notorious 
between 1972 and 1981, and the documents presented Congress in 1981 were so clear in 
their references to such taxes as work-related expenses, that the 97th Congress intention-
ally chose to repeal sub silentio the "income available" standard of the 76th Congress, 
The change in agency practice seems established. Whether Congress had adequate notice 
of the change is unclear. What is clear is that Congress had no notice of the fact that the 
change would create a conflict with long standing and familiar interpretations of 
§ 602(a)(7). We therefore refuse to hold that Congress has repealed a forty-year-old pol-
icy by implication. 
Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 
104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). 
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ing section 602(a)(8) in 1968,63 the HEW implementing regulation, 
(a)(6)(iv), defined "earned income" as "total" income, "irrespective 
of personal expenses, such as income tax deductions . . . ."64 A 
companion regulation, (a)(7)(i), indicated that all "personal and 
non-personal" work expenses were to be deducted from the "gross 
amount of 'earned income' " after the work incentive disregard had 
been deducted. 65 These regulations remain relatively unchanged 
under OBRA.66 
The regulations implementing section 602(a)(8) seem to contra-
dict the 602(a)(7) regulations. Under 602(a)(7), tax withholdings 
were not considered work expenses, because they were treated as 
nonincome items under the (a)(3)(ii)(D) availability regulations long 
before the work expense allowance and its (a)(3)(iv) regulation were 
added.67 Under the 602(a)(8) regulations, tax withholdings were 
considered "personal" work expenses, which were disregarded from 
"earned income."68 
These contradk:tions raise two distinct issues. The first is defini-
tional: whether the definition of "earned income" in (a)(6)(iv) con-
trols the meaning of "income" in (a)(3)(ii)(D). The second is 
operational: whether the 602(a)(8) regulations control the 602(a)(7) 
calculations. In addressing these issues, it should be kept in mind 
that prior to OBRA these contradictions were of purely theoretical 
significance, since under either set of regulations tax withholdings 
were not considered income in determining need. 69 
63. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text. 
64. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1970) provided: 
(6) Disregard of earned income; definition. Provide that for purposes of disregarding 
earned income the agency policies will include: (i) A definition of "earned income" in 
accordance with the provisions of subdivisions (iii) through (viii) of this subparagraph; 
and 
(iv) . . . [T]he term "earned income" means the total amount, irrespective of personal ex-
penses, such as income-tax deductions, lunches, and transportation to and from work, and 
irrespective of expenses of employment which are not personal, such as the cost of tools, 
materials, special uniforms, or transportation to call on customers. 
(emphasis added). 
65. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(7)(i) (1970) provided: 
(1) Disregard of earned income; method. (i) Provide that the following method will be 
used for disregarding earned income: The applicable amounts of earned income to be 
disregarded will be deducted from the gross amount of "earned income," and all work 
expenses, personal and non-personal, will then be deducted. Only the net amount re-
maining will be applied in determining need and the amount of the assistance payment. 
66. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1983). 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(7)(i) (1983) has re-
mained relatively unchanged except that since OBRA it no longer applies to AFDC. The 
disregard system enacted by OBRA is implemented in 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(l l) (1983). 
67. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1983), with origins dating back to 1940, defines "in-
come" as "net income available" and may be construed as not including tax withholdings. See 
note 38 supra and accompanying text. It continues to exist virtually unchanged after OBRA. 
See note 37 supra. 
68. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text. 
69. See notes 47-50 & 61 supra and accompanying text. 
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1. DEFINING "INCOME" AND "EARNED INCOME" 
In .Dickenson v. Petit, 70 the court reasoned that "income" in sec-
tion 602(a)(7) must include tax withholdings because "in common 
parlance," "earned income" would logically be defined as a "subset" 
of income.71 The court reasoned thus: since "earned income" in-
cludes tax withholdings72 and "income" includes "earned income" 
(and unearned income), "income" must also include tax withhold-
ings. While different kinds of income, including both earned and 
unearned, may be considered in making the need determination 
under 602(a)(7),73 there are persuasive reasons why 602(a)(7) "in-
come" should not be defined to include all that the (a)(6)(iv)74 regu-
lation defines as "earned income."75 
First, because the two statutory provisions were enacted at differ-
ent times and with different purposes, it is not necessary that the 
definitions of "income" and "earned income" be entirely consis-
tent. 76 When the work incentive disregard in section 602(a)(8) was 
70. 569 F. Supp. 636 (D. Me. 1983) (su=ary judgment granted), ajfd., 728 F.2d 23 (Isl 
Cir. 1984). 
71. 569 F. Supp. at 640; see a/so James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794,802 (3d Cir. 1983); Bell 
v. Hettleman, 558 F. Supp. 386,393 (D. Md.), ajfd. sub nom. Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 
(4th Cir. 1983); J)ickenson v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. at 1100, 1111 (previous disposition of the 
J)ickenson case), ajfd. on other grounds, 692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1982). 
72. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1969) (quoted at note 64 supra). 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1982). This section speaks in terms of "other income and re-
sources," and in that sense includes all kinds of income and resources that a family may have 
at its disposal (such "income and resources," however, must be "available"), But cf. James v, 
O'Bannon, 715 F. 2d 794, 802 & n.17 (3d Cir. 1983) (phrase "any other income" refers to 
income other than earned and AFDC income). 
14. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) (1969) (quoted in note 64 supra). 
15. See notes 75-84 infra and accompanying text. 
76. The§ 602(a)(7) "income" provision was originally enacted in 1939. See note 23 supra. 
It was reenacted in 1962 when the work expense allowance was added. See note 24 supra. It 
was again reenacted with minor revisions in 1968 when§ 602(a)(8) was amended to add the 
"earned income" provision. See note 25 supra. The meaning of "income" in § 602(a)(7) as 
originally enacted in 1939 and reenacted in 1962 and 1968 should not be affected by the addi-
tion of "earned income" in § 602(a)(8) in 1968. See IA SUTHERLAND, supra note 19, at 
§ 22.33: 
The provisions of the original act or section reenacted by the amendment are held to have 
been the law since they were first enacted, and the provisions introduced by the amend-
ment are considered to have been enacted at the time the amendment took effect. Thus, 
rights and liabilities accrued under the provisions of the original act which are reenacted 
are not affected by the amendment. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); cf. RAM v. Blum, 533 F. Supp. 933, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Since the 
ninety-seventh Congress did not amend the language initially enacted by the seventy-sixth 
Congress, the relevant question is not how the ninety-seventh Congress understands the word 
"income," but how the seventy-sixth Congress understood that word."). 
The reenactment of§ 602(a)(7) with the term "income" in 1962 and 1968 indicates that 
Congress accepted the prior construction of "income." The use of "earned income" rather 
than "income" in the 1968 amendments to§ 602(a)(8) indicates that Congress intended that 
"earned income" should have a different meaning from that which had been accorded 
§ 602(a)(7) "income." See IA SUTHERLAND, supra note 19, at § 22.33: 
Words and provisions used in the original act or section are presumed to be used in the 
same sense in the amendment. Moreover, the legislature is presumed to know the prior 
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revised in 1968,77 6O2(a)(7) was controlling the determination of 
need and had been doing so for twenty-nine years.78 The sole pur-
pose of section 6O2(a)(8) was creation of the work incentive disre-
gard.79 The only textual effect that it had on section 6O2(a)(7) was 
the addition at the beginning of that section of this language: "except 
as may otherwise be provided in clause (8) . . . ."80 It did not refer 
to "work expenses," nor did it purport to detract from "making the 
determination [of need] under clause (7)."81 
The rationale behind the broad regulatory definition of 6O2(a)(8) 
"earned income" did not similarly apply to section 6O2(a)(7) "in-
come." In calculating the work incentive disregard, "earned in-
come" was defined as broadly as possible to enhance the 
employment incentive by maximizing the amount of earned income 
that the AFDC recipient was allowed to retain. 82 The need for an 
expansive definition of income is unique to section 6O2(a)(8) and the 
work incentive disregard; it is inconsistent with the availability con-
cept of "income" under section 6O2(a)(7).83 
Second, the .Dickenson argument in effect substitutes gross in-
come for the term "income." While semantically it may seem rea-
sonable to do so, in fact, as used in section 6O2(a)(7), the term 
construction of the original act, and if words or provisions in the act or section amended 
that had been previously construed are repeated in the amendment, it is held that the 
legislature adopted the prior construction of the word or provision. But an amendment 
substituting a different term or provision indicates that the judicial construction of the 
former term did not correspond with the legislative intent and a different interpretation 
should be given the new term. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
11. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
78. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text. 
19. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. 
80. The relevant text of the 1962 and 1968 versions of the statute appears at notes 24 & 25 
supra. 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1982). See note 25 supra for the text of the statute. 
82. Because the work incentive disregard was calculated as a percentage of "earned in-
come," the broader the definition of that term, the larger the amount from which the disregard 
would be calculated. This rationale for the expansive definition of "earned income" was con-
firmed in Arizona Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Department of HEW, 449 F.2d 456, 469-71 (9th 
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972), and Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Depart-
ment of HEW, 448 F.2d 209, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 
1117 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). 
The Senate Report discussing the proposed work incentive disregard (at a point when the 
amount under consideration was the first $50 plus one-half of remaining earnings) indicates 
that Congress intended that the calculation be based on gross earnings rather than "available" 
income: 
As an example of how these provisions would work, consider a family consisting of a 
mother and three children who have a grant of$200 a month. If the mother goes to work 
and earns $120 in a month, her family will get the $120 of earnings plus $165 of grant 
(one-half of the earnings above $50 would have been deducted) for a total of $285. 
S. REP. No. 744, at 159, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2996, supra note 
27. 
83. See notes 31-38 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the availability con-
cept of "income." 
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"income" is properly read as available income. A broader term -
"earned income" -was introduced in section 6O2(a)(8) and defined 
in (a)(6)(iv) as representing the largest possible amount - greater 
than available income - from which to calculate the work incentive 
disregard. 84 
2. Statutory Control of the Calculation of Income 
The court in Be!/ v. Hettleman, 85 interprets the language in sec-
tion 6O2(a)(7), "except as may otherwise be provided in clause (8),"86 
as directing that section 6O2(a)(8) has controlled all calculations in-
volving "earned income," including the deduction of tax withhold-
ings and work expenses, since 1968.87 Such a reading has little to 
recommend it. It is hard to comprehend how 6O2(a)(8) could be said 
to control the deduction of work expenses when its sole purpose was 
calculation of the work incentive disregard, and it literally contained 
no reference to work expenses.88 The Be!!court ignores the 6O2(a)(8) 
language specifying that it applies "in making the determination 
under paragraph (7)."89 The "except as otherwise provided in para-
graph (8)" language at the beginning of 6O2(a)(7) is best explained as 
a device to maximize the benefit of the work incentive disregard to 
the recipient by providing that it be calculated first.90 
In James v. O'Bannon,91 the court contends that the (a)(6)(iv) reg-
ulation deemed ... [tax withholdings] ... to be a work-related ex-
pense"92 and should be accorded deference because its promulgation 
84. For the reasons underlying a broader definition of "earned income," see note 82 supra. 
The .Dickenson court argued that it could "find no statutory language or legislative history 
which would indicate that the term 'earned income,' as used in subsection 402(a)(8), was in-
tended by Congress to be read more broadly than the more general term 'income' used in 
subsection 402(a)(7)." 569 F. Supp. at 640. However, there is no direct evidence that Congress 
intended that the term be read more narrowly either. In fact, virtually every passage cited by 
the court in support of its argument contrasts earned income with income qualified by some 
other modifier - "income from any source,'' "all income regardless of source,'' "total in-
come," "gross income,'' etc. 569 F. Supp. at 640-41; note 56 supra (quoting 536 F. Supp. at 
1110). If "income" clearly is broader than "earned income" in any more than a semantic 
sense, there would seem to be little need for these clarifying phrases. 
85. 558 F. Supp. 386 (D. Md.), qffd sub nom. Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 
1983). 
86. This language remains substantially the same in the statute after OBRA. The relevant 
text of the statute as amended in 1968 and 1981 appears at notes 25 & 28 supra. 
87. 558 F. Supp. at 393 & n.10; cf. James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 805-06 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(§ 602(a)(8) controls all disregards based on language in 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1969) 
which indicates that available income is to be determined after policies regarding disregards 
have been applied). But see note 61 supra. 
88. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text. 
89. This language remains in the statute after OBRA. The relevant text of the statute as 
amended in 1968 and 1981 appears, respectively, at notes 25 & 28 supra. 
90. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler 
v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984). 
9 I. 715 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1983). 
92. 715 F.2d at 805. 
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was an exercise of the agency's generally "broad rule-making 
power."93 In making this assertion, the James court presumes a con-
nection between this regulation and the work expense allowance 
added to 602(a)(7) in 1962.94 It seems much more likely, however, 
that the significance of the (a)(6)(iv) and the (a)(7)(i) regulations was 
limited to implementation of the 1968 amendments to 602(a)(8). 
First, the regulations were promulgated in 1969, seven years after the 
enactment of the work expense allowance in 602(a)(7).95 Second, the 
regulations refer only to "earned income," a statutory term appear-
ing only in 602(a)(8).96 Third, another regulation, (a)(3)(iv), already 
provided for the deduction of work expenses and was more consis-
tent with the statutory treatment of the work expense allowance.97 
With this (a)(3)(iv) regulation in place, the only purpose served by 
including withheld taxes as part of "earned income" in (a)(6)(iv) was 
to ensure a broad interpretation of "earned income" so as to maxi-
mize the work incentive disregard. For these reasons, any deference 
accorded to the (a)(6)(iv) regulation should be limited to its interpre-
tation of 602(a)(8) "earned income" for purposes of calculating the 
work incentive disregard.98 
The (a)(7)(i) regulation providing for the deduction of work ex-
penses (including taxes) from "earned income" after the work incen-
tive disregard has been deducted may be viewed as no more than a 
practical clarification. A new term - "earned income" - had been 
introduced to implement a new step in the need calculation process 
- the work incentive disregard. It was defined broadly to include 
items disregarded in the ultimate need determination under 
93. 715 F.2d at 806 (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 277 n.28 (1969)). In 
this passage, the James court refers to regulation (a)(3)(iv). This reference, however, appears 
to be a misprint. The court most likely intended the reference to be to (a)(6)(iv) since the 
passage occurs in the midst of a discussion directed solely at (a)(6)(iv) and the (a)(3)(iv) regula-
tion is not mentioned in any other place in the opinion. 
94. But see RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 648 n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 1983): 
Furthermore, even if the Court were of the view that § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) conflicts with the 
Jong-standing availability principle of§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D), it would rely on the latter sub-
section. It is that regulation that construes the statutory section at issue in this proceeding. 
Contradictory regulations interpreting other statutory sections would hardly present a ba-
sis, as agency interpretations, for deference by this Court. · 
95. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. 
96. See Williamson v. Gibbs, 562 F. Supp. 687, 689 (W.D. Wash. 1983) ("[T]he former 
... provision interpreting 'earned income' does not call for a modification of the longstanding 
interpretation of 'income' contained in 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D), particularly since the 
two phrases are different and serve different purposes within the statutory and regulatory 
framework of the AFDC program."). The relevant texts of the 1968 statute and implementing 
regulations appear at notes 25 & 64-65 supra. 
97. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(iv) (1970). See note 24 supra for the relevant portion of the 
regulation. This regulation is consistent with the statutory treatment of the work expense al-
lowance, because in keeping with the availability principle underlying § 602(a)(7) it classified 
work expenses as unavailable income. 
98. See note 82 supra and accompanying text. 
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602(a)(7). This regulation may be viewed as a way of ensuring that 
these "non-income" items included in the definition of "earned in-
come" would not be carried over into 602(a)(7) "income" in the ulti-
mate calculation of need.99 
II. OBRA 
Thus far this Note has contended that, at the time that OBRA 
was enacted, tax withholdings were considered neither "income" nor 
"work expenses" in making the need calculation under section 
602(a)(7). With this pre-OBRA background in mind, the ultimate 
question to be resolved is whether Congress in enacting OBRA in-
tended that tax withholdings be included within the flat work ex-
pense disregard. 100 The OBRA amendments to AFDC were 
designed to cut the program's cost.101 Purportedly, the amendments 
were to accomplish this purpose by reducing fraud and administra-
tive inefficiency and encouraging work, 102 rather than simply by re-
ducing benefits.103 Courts ruling for HHS have focused on the cost-
saving purpose of OBRA as evidence that mandatory withholdings 
were meant to be included in the flat work expense disregard. 104 
99. Between the 1968 amendment and the passage of OBRA, the disregard of work ex-
penses continued to be addressed by § 602(a)(7) and its (a)(3)(iv) implementing regulation. 
See notes 24 & 97 supra. The question is whether mandatory tax withholdings similarly con-
tinued as nonincome items under the§ 602(a)(7) definition of available income, or after 1968 
were deducted only because they were classified as an item to be disregarded under the 
§ 602( a)(8) regulations. C.f. text at note 61 supra ( explaining that it is not necessary for states to 
distinguish between work expenses and tax withholdings after Shea). There would be no need 
for the (a)(3)(iv) regulation if the deduction of work expenses was controlled by (a)(7)(i). The 
fact that the disregard of work expenses continued to be addressed by§ 602(a)(7) despite their 
inclusion in the (a)(7)(i) regulation to § 602(a)(8) suggests that it is perfectly reasonable that 
mandatory tax withholdings also continued to be controlled by § 602(a)(7). 
100. A conclusion that mandatory tax withholdings were treated as work expenses prior to 
OBRA would not literally exclude the possibility that Congress may not have intended that 
they be included in the flat $75 disregard. However, this is the same weak position that the 
Note contends has been taken by the Secretary - that Congress altered by implication in 
OBRA longstanding administrative practice under AFDC. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d I 109 
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984): 
In our view, if mandatory payroll deductions enter into income at all, they must be treated 
as work-related expenses subject to the $75 ceiling enacted by OBRA, because no separate 
disregard for payroll withholdings exists. It is this argument which the JJickenson, 
O'Bannon, and Bel/courts found persuasive .... We, however, reject the original prem-
ise that such withholding enters into income. 
707 F.2d at 1120 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
IOI. See S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st. Sess. 501-21, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CoNO. 
& AD. NEWS 396, 767-86 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 139, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS]; N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1981, at A26, col. I. 
102. See notes 121-33 in.fro and accompanying text. 
103. Nowhere in the statute or legislative history is there any mention whatsoever of a 
reduction in the base level of benefits established by the states' standards of need. C.f. Milliken 
Orders Cut in Welfare, Detroit News, May 15, 1981, at Bl, col. I (five percent across-the-board 
cut in welfare benefits ordered.) 
104. See James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 808-10 (3d Cir. 1983); Bell v. Hettleman, 558 F. 
Supp. 386,394 (D. Md.), qffd sub nom. Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983); Dicken-
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Courts ruling for the recipients have reasoned that individual treat-
ment of such payroll deductions is unrelated to fraud and ineffi-
ciency in the program, 105 and that to include tax withholdings in the 
flat work expense disregard would be inconsistent with the objective 
of encouraging work. 106 
A. SPECIFIC REFERENCES IN THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The language of the OBRA amendments is inconclusive in deter-
mining congressional intent in this instance. There is no reference in 
the statute to tax withholdings, nor is there a definition of "income," 
"earned income," or "work expenses."107 The OBRA Congress did 
not alter the language in section 602 (a)(7) regarding the considera-
tion of a recipient's income in determining need, nor did it give any 
indication that it intended a new meaning for that language.108 It 
would seem that Congress intended that the ultimate determination 
of need would continue to be made under 602(a)(7), since it retained 
the language at the beginning of section 602(a)(8) that refers to 
"making the determination under paragraph (7)."109 
Nor are the terms "income," "earned income" or "work ex-
penses" clarified in either the Senate or House Conference Commit-
tee reports regarding OBRA.110 The Senate report speaks of "total 
income" in describing prior law, "income" in describing what re-
mains after disregards and what is used to determine assistance, 
"earned income" with respect to OBRA disregards, and "gross in-
come" in connection with a new OBRA eligibility provision not rele-
son v. Petit, 536 F. Supp. 1100, 1104 (D. Me.), ajfd. on other grounds, 692 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 
1982). 
105. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. 
Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983); notes 121-31 infra and accompanying text. 
106. See notes 132-36 infra and accompanying text. 
107. See James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d at 802 ("Unfortunately, as we have earlier indi-
cated, 'the language [of the statute] is not helpful here.' Turner [v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1114 
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984)]."). But cf. 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 106, 95 Stat. 357,360 (1981) 
(revising and reenacting the Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, § 5(e), 91 Stat. 958, 
963 (1977) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2014(e) (Supp. 1982)) ("All households with 
earned income shall be allowed an additional deduction of 18 per centum of all earned income 
... to compensate for taxes, other mandatory deductions from salary, and work expenses." 
(emphasis added)). The language in one statute may aid in the interpretation of similar lan-
guage in another "where ... both statutes are on such closely related subjects that considera-
tion of one would naturally bring the other to mind." 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 19, at 
§ 45.15. 
108. See notes 25 & 28 supra and accompanying text. 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A) (1982); see note 89 supra and accompanying text. 
ll0. S. REP. No. 139 at 501, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 767, supra 
note 101; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 978, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CooE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1010, 1340. 
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vant to the tax withholdings issue.111 In describing the pre-OBRA 
work expense allowance, the Senate report gives examples of work 
expenses, but it does not include mandatory tax withholdings among 
these. 112 
In congressional hearings regarding the proposed OBRA legisla-
tion, the statements of some witnesses who testified against the pro-
posed flat work expense disregard indicated that these individuals 
thought that mandatory tax withholdings were included in the disre-
gard.113 Such testimony, however, generally constitutes only weak 
evidence of legislative intent. 114 In particular, these statements were 
from opponents of the OBRA legislation, and should be discounted 
because of the likelihood that witnesses will exaggerate the negative 
points of legislation that they oppose. 115 
Relevant testimony from proponents of the flat work expense dis-
regard includes that of then Secretary of HHS, Richard 
Schweiker. 116 The Secretary, describing the changes proposed by 
OBRA, stated that the $30 and one-third disregard would be de-
ducted from "net income." 117 This description suggests that tax 
withholdings would be deducted prior to and separate from work 
expenses. 118 
Ill. s. REP. No. 139 at 501-04, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 767-70, 
supra note IOI. 
112. s. REP. No. 139 at 501, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 767, supra 
note IOI. 
113. See I Budget Issues for Fiscal Year 1982: Hearings Before tire House Comm. 011 tl,e 
Budget, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 419 (1981) (statement of Marian Wright Edelman, Children's 
Defense Fund); Spending Reduction Proposals: Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Fi11a11ce, 
Part I, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 227 (1981) (statement of Marian Wright Edelman, Children's 
Defense Fund); Administration's Proposed Savings in Unemployment Compensation, Public 
Assistance, and Social Services Programs: Hearings Before tire Subcomm. on Public Assistance 
and Unemployment Compensation of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 89 (1981) (statement of Christine Pratt-Marston, National Anti-Hunger Coalition) [here-
inafter cited as Administration's Proposed Savings], quoted in Dickenson v. Petit, 569 F. Supp. 
636, 642 (D. Me. 1983), qffd., 728 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1984). 
114. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 19, at§ 48.10; see also Kelly ex. rel Lofstock v. Perales, 
566 F. Supp. 785, 790 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (One cannot determine "whether Congress enacted 
the legislation despite such co=ents, or whether the co=ents were considered an inaccurate 
description of the effect of the legislation, or indeed to what extent they were noted at all."). 
115. CJ. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964) (statements 
of legislators opposing bill are suspect evidence of legislative intent). 
116. See Administration's Proposed Savings, supra note 113, at 6-7 (statement of Richard S. 
Schweiker, former Secretary of HHS). 
117. He noted that "the $30 and one-third now disregarded as a work incentive will be 
computed on net income, rather than gross as is presently done, and will not apply to earnings 
already disregarded for work expenses and child care." Id. at 7, quoted in Dickenson v. Petit, 
569 F. Supp. 636, 641 (D. Me. 1983), qffd., 728 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1984); Bell v. Hettleman, 558 
F. Supp. 386, 395 (D. Md.), qffd. sub nom. Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983); 
James v. O'Bannon, 557 F. Supp. 631, 642 (E.D. Pa. 1982), qffd., 715 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1983). 
118. The term "net income" in the Secretary's statement is ambiguous. It is fairly clear 
that by "gross income" he meant "earned income," defined in 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(6)(iv) 
(1983) as including tax withholdings. "Net income" could refer to "gross income" less the 
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B. Interpretation Consistent with Legislative Objectives 
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the explicit language of 
the OBRA legislation and its legislative history shed meager light on 
congressional intent regarding the treatment of mandatory tax with-
holdings. The legislative purposes of OBRA, however, as expressed 
in its legislative history, do provide at least some insight into the 
treatment that Congress may have intended to be accorded 
mandatory tax withholdings under the current statutory scheme.119 
The analysis below demonstrates that inclusion of such taxes as in-
come in determining need does not promote any of the avowed pur-
poses of the OBRA amendments. 
The general aim of OBRA was to reduce federal spending.120 
The changes in the AFDC program were to forward this objective 
through prevention of fraud and abuse and promotion of adminis-
trative efficiency, confinement of assistance to the "truly needy," and 
encouragement of AFDC recipients to work. 
According to the committee reports, the work expense disregard 
was standardized primarily to prevent abuse of the disregard and to 
reduce administrative complexity and error. 121 The lack of a clear 
work expense and child care disregards. However, "net income" could also refer to "available 
income," that is, "gross income" less tax withholdings. In fact, the most logical reading of his 
statement is that the work expense and child care disregards were to be deducted from "net 
income" before the $30 and one-third disregard would apply; the reference to the work ex-
pense and child care disregards is otherwise superfluous. 
Secretary Schweiker well may have thought that the flat $75 work expense disregard in-
cluded tax withholdings, but it is the sense in which his statement would have been understood 
that is relevant to a determination of congressional intent. Cf. Dickenson v. Petit, 569 F. Supp. 
636, 642 (D. Me. 1983), ajfd., 728 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1984) (referring to statements of witnesses 
suggesting that tax withholdings were work expenses, cited at note 113 supra: 
Although these interpretations of the AFDC statutes are of no more than marginal 
significance in determining the meaning of"income" as used in subsection 402(a)(7), they 
seriously erode the foundation for plaintiffs contention that, in adopting OBRA's ap-
proach to the standardization of work expenses, Congress never contemplated or intended 
the work disincentive which results from considering payroll withholdings as "work 
expenses."). 
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964) (noting that one should 
look to the sponsors of legislation when the meaning of statutory language is in doubt). 
119. The purposes ofOBRA must also be considered in light of the overall purposes of the 
AFDC program. These purposes include providing adequate income for needy families with 
dependent children, keeping such families together, and encouraging adult members of such 
families to get and keep jobs. See42 U.S.C § 601 (1982). The provision embodying the over-
all purposes of AFDC was left intact by OBRA. See Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981). 
120. See general(Yhearings cited at note 113 supra;note 101 supra and accompanying text. 
121. The Senate committee report expressed these goals very clearly: 
The committee believes that the current earned income disregard provisions have resulted 
in serious problems. Because Federal law neither defines nor limits what may be consid-
ered a work-related expense, there is now great variation among the States and many 
instances of abuse. In addition, the requirement for itemization of individual work ex-
penses has resulted in administrative complexity and error. It is the committee's belief 
that the change in the law with respect to work expenses would have the effect of limiting 
abuse of the work expense disregard and also result in simpler and more accurate deter-
mination of benefits. 
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definition as to what constituted a work-related expense, the open-
ended nature of the disregard, and difficulties in documenting ex-
penses, encouraged fraud and abuse. 122 These problems and the re-
quirement that work expenses be itemized separately and 
reimbursed in full, 123 resulted in an administrative burden and in-
creased the likelihood of error. 124 While the establishment of a flat 
work expense disregard advances the purposes of discouraging abuse 
and promoting administrative ease and accuracy, these goals may be 
achieved without the inclusion of mandatory tax withholdings. Such 
withholdings are prime examples of amounts that are clearly de-
fined, not subject to falsification, and not difficult to document or 
calculate. 125 Thus, separate itemization of tax withholdings is unre-
lated to the problems that the flat work expense disregard was in-
tended to remedy. 
The goal of confining AFDC to the "truly needy" 126 was 
achieved primarily by changing the formulae for determining eligi-
bility and need for assistance. 127 These changes resulted in a loss of 
eligibility or reduction in benefits for those whom Congress consid-
ered less needy than others. 128 This goal, however, is not explicitly 
associated with the establishment of the flat work expense disre-
s. REP. No. 139 at 501-02, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 768, supra note 
IOI. 
122. Id 
123. The Supreme Court imposed this requirement in Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 
(1974). See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text. 
124. S. REP. No. 139 at 501-02, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 768, 
supra note IOI. 
125. See Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heck-
ler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
126. See S. REP. No. 139 at 504, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 771, 
supra note 101 ("[T]he view of the committee (is] that welfare assistance should be limited to 
those who are most in need."); Administration's Proposed Savings, supra note 113, at 6 (state• 
ment of Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of HHS) ("Our proposal contains a number of provi-
sions designed to limit eligibility and to better target limited funds to those most in need."). 
127. These changes involve the calculation of and limitations on the work incentive disre-
gard, a lower maximum ceiling on resources excluded from need determination, consideration 
of food stamps and housing subsidies in determining need, a gross income limit for eligibility, 
treatment of earned income tax credit advances as income, and consideration of stepparent 
income. See S. REP. No. 139 at 501-07, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 
767-73, supra note IOI. These changes constitute the principal cost saving measures taken in 
OBRA with respect to AFDC. The most significant other change concerns the creation of 
work programs. See S. REP. No. 139 at 507-10, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS at 773-76, supra note 101. 
128. Those considered less needy are those recipients ''working full time at wages well 
above the State welfare standard." S. REP. No. 139 at 502, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CooE CoNo. 
& ADMIN. NEWS at 768, supra note IOI. Studies conducted in New York City, Georgia and 
Michigan, however, on the effects of the OBRA changes, report a disastrous impact on the 
working poor. See Center for Political Studies, Working Female-Headed Families in Poverty: 
Three Studies of Low-Income Families Affected by the AFDC Policy Changes of 1981 (Mar. 
1984) (report available from the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor). 
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gard.129 One might argue that by preventing recipient abuse of an 
open-ended work expense allowance the flat disregard. reduces the 
benefits of less needy or deserving recipients or at least prompts re-
cipients with extravagant work expenses to attempt to economize.130 
Nevertheless, even if a "serving only the truly needy" purpose is 
thereby ascribed to the disregard, that purpose is not advanced by 
inclusion of mandatory tax withholdings. Not only are tax with-
holdings easily verifiable and therefore not subject to abuse, they 
also are not subject to economizing. 131 They are mandatory ex-
penses over which the applicant has no control, and because they are 
never available for the recipient to use, they can hardly be said to 
relate to "true need." 
The Senate OBRA report reaffirms the overall AFDC policy ob-
jective of encouraging independence from welfare through employ-
ment.132 The committee notes that the $30 and one-third work 
incentive disregard has been abused and has failed to encourage em-
ployment, and suggests that these occurrences underlie the cutting 
back on this method of promoting employment.133 However, while 
OBRA clearly demonstrates a change in congressional emphasis 
129. The Senate report confirms that the flat work expense disregard was not perceived as 
a means of limiting assistance to the truly needy. After discussing how the proposed flat work 
expense disregard would deal with the problems of abuse and administrative complexity inher-
ent in the pre-OBRA open-ended disregard, the report continues: 
The committe [sic] recognizes, however, that these changes [in the work expense and 
child care expense disregards] do not address another serious problem with the disregard 
provisions - the fact that . . . families may remain on welfare even after they are work-
ing full time at wages well above the State welfare standard. For this reason, the commit-
tee amendment would limit the application of the [work incentive] disregard to the first 
four consecutive months . . . . 
S. REP. No. 139 at 502, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CooECONG. &Ao. NEWS at 768, supra note 101. 
130. In hearings on the OBRA changes, Secretary Schweiker mentioned the latter possibil-
ity in his description of the standard work and child care disregards. He noted that "[t]hese 
changes should simplify administration, reduce error, and provide and [sic] incentive for 
AFDC recipients to find the most economical ways to meet their work expenses." Administra-
tion's Proposed Savings, supra note 113, at 11 (statement of Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of 
HHS). 
131. See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 646 n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
132. s. REP. No. 139 at 507, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 774, supra 
note 101. This purpose of encouraging employment is mentioned most often, however, in the 
portions of the report dealing with work programs. S. REP. No. 139 at 507-10, reprinted in 
1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 773-76, supra note 101. See also 42 U.S.C. § 601 
(1982) ("[a]uthorization of appropriations" section describing purpose of AFDC). 
133. s. REP. No. 139 at 502, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 768, supra 
note 101. The Senate report also notes: 
The $30 and one-third disregard was added to the law in 1967 because it was believed 
that it would operate as an incentive for mothers to move into employment and to become 
self-sufficient. . . . [T]his has not been the case. . . • 
The committee believes that the $30 and one-third disregard of earnings should be 
applied to the initial months in which a welfare recipient is employed. . . . Applied in 
this way, the committee believes that the provision would provide a useful buffer to those 
trying to readjust to employment, but without resulting in keeping families on welfare for 
an unlimited period. Combined with the other provisions . . . aimed at providing em-
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from that of the 1962 and 1967 amendments, "apparently . . . aban-
don[ing] the policy of attempting to encourage self-sufficiency by 
creation of financial incentives,"134 there is no indication in the 
amended statute or the legislative history that Congress intended to 
create a disincentive to work. 135 Counting tax withholdings as in-
come and including them in the fiat work expense disregard creates 
just such a disincentive. 136 
III. FAIRNESS AS A RELEVANT INFERENCE -A PROCESS VIEW 
A conclusion that the OBRA Congress intended that tax with-
holdings continue to be treated as nonincome distinct from work ex-
penses is not inconsistent with either the expressed legislative 
purposes of the AFDC amendments or the provisions themselves on 
their face. Therefore, it can be argued that this interpretation should 
be adopted on the authority of the established principle that, when 
reasonable, provisions of the Social Security Act should be construed 
in favor of those seeking bene.fits. 137 It is clear, however, that OBRA 
itself was primarily a revenue measure. 138 It may be true that inter-
preting "work expenses" to include mandatory tax withholdings 
would achieve greater cost savings than continuing to classify them 
ployment for AFDC recipients, these changes are expected to decrease welfare depen-
dency .... 
s. REP. No. 139 at 502, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 768-69, supra note 
101. 
134. James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 809 (3d Cir. 1983). 
135. See notes 144-47 infra and accompanying text. 
136. The disincentive results because while work expenses may roughly approximate $75 
per month, combined with tax withholdings the total will invariably exceed that amount, thus 
leaving the working recipient with less disposable monthly income than the nonworking rccip• 
ient. See generally notes 141-43 infra and accompanying text. 
137. In Damon v. Secretary of HEW, 557 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1977), the court emphasized: 
This court has repeatedly held that "the Social Security Act is a remedial statute, to be 
broadly construed and liberally applied" ... "in consonance with its ... humanitarian 
aims" .... These general principles of liberal construction plainly apply to the child's 
benefit provisions here under consideration. . . . In practical terms the principles mean 
that, when a Social Security Act provision can reasonably be construed in favor of the one 
seeking benefits, it should be so construed. 
557 F.2d at 33 (citations omitted). These principles apply to the AFDC program as part of the 
Social Security Act. See Simpson v. Miller, 535 F. Supp. 1041, 1050 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("King v. 
Smith and its progeny have erected a fundamental principle of AFDC jurisprudence: that the 
Social Security Act will not countenance depriving needy children of benefits because of fac-
tors beyond their control, and unrelated to their need."). See generally2A SUTHERLAND, supra 
note 19, at § 58.04 (nature of interests and kinds of persons affected should be considered in 
interpreting legislation); 3 SUTHERLAND, supra note 19, at§ 71.08 (statutes enacted to provide 
relief to the poor should be liberally construed). 
138. See note 120 supra and accompanying text; cf. Penner, How Fair is We!fare?, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 29, 1981, § Ill, at 2, col. 3 ("Policy makers constantly must make trade-offs be-
tween minimal living standards for the poorest of the poor, work disincentives, and costs. This 
Administration has chosen to increase work disincentives slightly in order to reduce costs."). 
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as nonincome.139 Nevertheless, just because Congress intended to 
cut costs through OBRA does not mean that any interpretation of 
OBRA that maximizes cost savings is presumptively consistent with 
congressional intent.140 
Although $75 is a conservative figure, it at least can be regarded 
as a reasonable legislative approximation of a working recipient's 
monthly job-related expenses.141 But it can only be so regarded if 
mandatory tax withholdings are excluded from the items covered by 
the disregard.142 If these amounts are computed as work expenses, 
then a disproportionate reduction in benefits is imposed on working 
relative to nonworking recipients by the OBRA amendments.143 
The James court dismissed the fact that inclusion of tax with-
holdings in the $75 work expense disregard penalized working recip-
ients by concluding that the legislative history of OBRA "reflects 
Congress' determination to effect a substantial departure from Con-
gress' original policy of avoiding financial disincentives to employ-
ment."144 It based its conclusion, however, on the rationale stated 
for eliminating the work incentive disregard.145 Congress did not de-
part from its policy of offsetting work disincentives - it retained the 
139. But see Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler 
v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984): 
If the disincentive provided is strong enough, there is no reason to believe that AFDC 
recipients will work in order to pay handsomely for the privilege. If that eventuality ma-
terializes, the result of the statutory construction which the government urge [sic) will be 
a rise in government spending through increased welfare payments - an end result which 
would contravene the intent of both the 76th and the 97th Congresses. 
707 F.2d at 1123; Co=ent, supra note 9, at 89-91. 
140. See Kelly ex rel Lofstock v. Perales, 566 F. Supp. 785, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (discuss-
ing withholding issue in context of working stepparents). 
141. See RAM v. Blum, 564 F. Supp. 634, 644-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
142. See, e.g., Turner v. Woods, 559 F. Supp. 603, 614 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (average working 
AFDC family in California incurs each month $80 in out-of-pocket work-related expenses 
plus $83 in mandatory payroll deductions), ajfd sub nom. Turner v. Prod, 707 F.2d 1109 (9th 
Cir. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Heckler v. Turner, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (1984); Bell v. Hettleman, 
558 F. Supp. 386, 389 (D. Md.) (plaintiff Bell had monthly gross earnings of $617.05, out-of-
pocket work expenses of $92, mandatory tax withholdings of $46.22, and child care costs of 
$172), ajfd sub nom Bell v. Massinga, 721 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983); Dickenson v. Petit, 536 F. 
Supp. 1100, 1107-08 (D. Me. 1982) (named plaintiffs had the following monthly incomes and 
expenses: Brenda Dickenson - gross income $606.62, work expenses $72.15, taxes withheld 
$136.54; Susan Magoon - gross income $653.42, work expenses $13.87, taxes withheld $62.44; 
Donna Irish- gross income $642.28, work expenses $56.17, taxes withheld $160.02), ajfd, 728 
F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1984). 
143. The reduction in benefits results because any amount that is a cost of earning income 
and is not offset will be treated as income in calculating need in relation to the base standard 
set by each state. 
144. James v. O'Bannon, 715 F.2d 794, 809 (3d Cir. 1983). 
145. 715 F.2d at 809. The court quotes S. REP. No. 139 at 502-03, reprinted in 1981 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 769, supra note 101, which appears in part at note 133 supra. 
Without explanation, the court infers a departure from Congress' "original policy of avoiding 
financial disincentives to employment" from the Senate Budget Committee's determination "to 
abandon the policy of attempting to encourage . . . self-sufficiency by creation of financial 
incentives." 715 F.2d at 809 (emphasis added). 
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work expense and child care disregards designed to equalize the ben-
efits of working and nonworking recipients. 146 The distinction is 
fundamental. Elimination of the $30 and one-third disregard simply 
equalizes the benefits of working and nonworking recipients. It con-
stitutes recapture of a financial incentive granted to employed recipi-
ents earning more than the minimum standard of need, which 
Congress determined was not accomplishing its intended objective of 
encouraging employment.147 Inclusion of tax withholdings in the 
$75 work incentive disregard, however, leaves working recipients 
with less disposable income than the minimum standard. 
Courts ought to inf er that legislatures intend to be fair. 148 Ac-
cordingly, when Congress intends that particular subjects of legisla-
tion be treated unfairly, the courts should require an explicit 
expression of that intention, 149 to ensure both that the legislative pro-
cess be transparent150 and that the opportunity for the interests of 
those affected be fully perceived and represented. 151 Congress can 
satisfy this requirement either by explicit language in the statute or 
by clear statements of intent in the supporting materials. 152 If Con-
gress's. objectives constitute a "hidden agenda," evident neither from 
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(iii) (1983). Cf. note 141 supra and accompanying text 
($75 is reasonable approximation of a working recipient's monthly job-related expenses). 
147. See note 133 supra and accompanying text. 
148. Cf.2 H. Hart & A. Sachs, The Legal Process 1410-11 (1958) (unpublished manuscript) 
("In trying to discharge th[e] function (of statutory interpretation] the court should: ... 5. Be 
mindful of the nature oflaw and of the fact that every statute is a part of the law and partakes 
of the qualities of law, and particularly of the quality of striving for even-handed justice.") 
[hereinafter cited as Hart & Sachs]; Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: 
Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982): 
[W]hen alternative readings of sovereign commands are plausible ... an interpreter fails 
to legitimate those commands when it chooses a reading that produces recognizably un-
fair results. . . . [P]resuming that Congress intends to wield its power to produce unfair 
results . . . renders judicial power incapable of legitimating legislative power. 
Id at 906-07 (footnotes omitted). 
In fact, proponents of the OBRA amendments repeatedly emphasized the unfairness of 
nonworking welfare recipients being better off than those who worked. See, e.g., Administra-
tion's Proposed Savings, supra note 113, at 6 (statement of Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of 
HHS) ("The American people strongly oppose assistance going to those who can work, those 
who have other sources of income, and those who get as much or more on we!fare as others get 
from working.") (emphasis added); 127 Cong. Rec. H3809 (daily ed. June 26, 1981) (statement 
of Rep. Latta) (OBRA partly directed at mollifying the "disgust" of his constituents at the 
perceived policy of favoring those who only received welfare over those who worked). 
149. See Hart & Sachs, supra note 148, at 1413 (One "polic[y] of clear statement [that] 
call[s] for particular mention .... forbids a court to understand a legislature as directing a 
departure from a generally prevailing principle or policy of law unless it does so clearly."), 
150. See ge11erallyT. LoWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 298-313 (1979). 
151. Cf. Comment, supra note 9, at 81-82 (welfare recipients have little lobbying strength). 
See ge11erally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981) (inability of disadvantaged groups to 
protect constitutional rights through legislative process). 
152. But cf. Note, supra note 148, at 899 ("equation of literalism with legislative intent" 
does not resolve problems of interpretation stemming from situations unforeseen by Congress 
· or from the limitations oflanguage). The situation being suggested here, however, is a deliber-
ate obfuscation of intent. 
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the face of the statute nor from statements of purpose, 153 the courts 
should not give effect to that agenda. 154 Congress is free, within the 
limits of the Constitution, to pass any legislation it chooses. 155 But 
when it places the courts in the position of adopting "hard" legisla-
tion by inf erring, on scant evidence, an intention to be inequitable, 
the institutional legitimacy of both the legislature and the judiciary is 
undermined.156 
CONCLUSION 
Prior to 1968, two facts are noteworthy with respect to mandatory 
tax withholdings and the calculation of need under the AFDC pro-
gram - the consistent adherence to the availability principle in 
counting a recipient's income, and the conspicuous omission of tax 
withholdings from the list of items that the work expense disregard 
was intended to cover. Courts holding that tax withholdings are in-
cluded within the flat $75 work expense disregard introduced by 
OBRA have relied largely upon the regulations implementing the 
work incentive disregard adopted in 1968 and out-of-context infer-
ences from Justice Powell's language in Shea v. Vialpando in con-
cluding that, whatever the status of such withholdings prior to 1968, 
after that time they were regarded as work expenses. There is, how-
ever, no direct evidence whatsoever that the administering agency 
intended that the regulations designed to implement the work incen-
tive disregard would override the preexisting statute and regulations 
controlling the work expense disregard and overall calculation of 
need, nor that Congress intended or apprehended any change in the 
153. Congress might adopt a "hidden agenda" to minimize public awareness and thereby 
deflect political pressure. q. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a .Device for Implementing Government 
Policy: A Comparison with .Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 735 (1970): 
Just why is it that in many cases legislators appear willing, with hardly any thought, to 
accept an expensive tax incentive program when they would just as quickly reject a simi-
lar direct expenditure program, even a much smaller one? . . . Is it that the legislators 
know full well what is involved, despite the complexity of tax bills, but believe the public 
will not perceive what is being done because of the complexity of tax bills and because tax 
expenditures do not show up in the budget? 
154. But cf. Note, supra note 148, at 906-07 (concerned with the undermining of legitimacy 
that occurs when strict adherence to the literal language of a statute as an expression oflegisla-
tive intent produces an unjust or incongruous result). This Note argues that similar problems 
of legitimacy arise if courts interpret statutes to produce inequitable results on the basis of 
unspoken intent. 
155. q. 2 Hart & Sachs, supra note 148, at 1410 ("In trying to discharge th[e] function [of 
statutory interpretation] the court should: l. Respect the position of the legislature as the chief 
policy-determining agency of the society, subject only to the limitations of the constitution 
under which it exercises its powers .... "). 
156. q. Note, supra note 148, at 903-04 ("[T]he legitimacy of [legislative] co=ands or 
processes depends in tum on the role the Court plays in shaping the meaning of statutes; that 
is, the legitimacy of statutory co=ands cannot be supported solely by appeal to the authority 
and competence of Congress.") & 912 ("[T]he Court's failure to exercise critical capacity by 
equitably interpreting statutes only fulfills its prophecy that regulatory law is pervasive, inex-
plicable, and uncertain."). 
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status of tax withholdings and the availability principle prior to 
OBRA. 
Similarly, there is virtually no direct evidence in either the statute 
or legislative history of OBRA that tax withholdings were intended 
to be included within the $75 work expense disregard. Nor would 
such an inclusion advance any of the stated goals of the various 
AFDC amendments. Inclusion of tax withholdings in the $75 allow-
ance for work expenses results in working AFDC recipients being 
left with less disposable income than the state's minimum standard 
of need and places them in a worse position than nonworking recipi-
ents. Absent a clear statement to the contrary, Congress should be 
presumed not to have intended to achieve such a palpably unfair 
result. 
